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CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
OUTSIDE THE COURTS 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional scholars agree about remarkably little. We even 
disagree about what counts as the Constitution. For example, many 
constitutional scholars believe that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is a 
lawful addition to the Constitution; 1 but many other scholars believe 
that the amendment was approved by dubious and probably illegitimate 
means. Nor do they agree on whether the process by which it was added 
to the Constitution is amenable to judicial review. Constitutional 
scholars also sharply disagree about the appropriate methodology for 
interpreting the Constitution. Constitutional scholars can, however, 
agree on at least one thing-the very thing that brought us together for 
this Symposium-the authority of H. Jefferson Powell as a 
constitutional scholar. When Professor Powell speaks, people, 
particularly constitutional scholars, should heed his call. Professor 
Powell's erudition, eloquence, research, and insights about 
constitutional law are, at least in my judgment, unparalleled among my 
• Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
I. Compare, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution, WALLST.J., May 13, 
1992, at A IS (arguing that the amendment was validly ratified), with Richard L Berke, I 789 Amendment is 
Rmifled but Now the Debate Begins, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1992, at A 1 (quoting Walter Dellinger's statement 
that the amendment was incapable of ratification). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment states that "[n]o law, 
varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect until an 
election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend. xxvn. 
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generation of constitutional scholars. So, when Professor Powell speaks 
about foreign affairs, it behooves us to listen and to learn. 
Professor Powell is distinctive (and distinguished) because he is one 
of the few constitutional scholars who have contributed and written 
extensively about a subject of keen interest to me-the Constitution 
outside of the Court. 2 Legal scholars are regrettably preoccupied with 
the work of the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court. I 
will not speculate as to why this obsession persists. Instead, my concern 
is with its costs. In particular, this obsession leads to a lack of 
appreciation for the extent to which national political leaders deliberate 
over, and even shape, constitutional meaning. As Professor Philip 
Bobbitt indicated, no systematic analysis of the quality and significance 
of these deliberations has yet been undertaken. 
My contribution to this Symposium will not fill this void. Instead, 
my focus will be on the risks and costs of the scholarly preoccupation 
with the Court, particularly with respect to how constitutional 
authorities other than the Court take the Constitution into account in 
deliberating over questions pertaining to constitutional meaning and 
their constitutional authority. One such question is whether the 
Constitution constrains or guides decision-making outside the courts? If 
so, how does it do this? To answer these (and other fundamental 
questions about the Constitution outside the Court), we need to examine 
closely what national political authorities say and do about the 
Constitution. 
2. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, ThE PREsiDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Carolina 
Academic Press 1002); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, ThE CONSnnrriON AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
(Carolina Academic Press 1999). 
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I. THE TRADITIONAL MODALITIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ARGUMENTATION 
At the outset, what national political leaders say about the 
Constitution confirms Professor Bobbitt's trenchant insight, reiterated in 
this Symposium, that they employ all six of the traditional modalities of 
constitutional argumentation? Three examples illustrate the deployment 
of these modalities in constitutional discourse outside the courts. The 
first example is the federal impeachment process. Throughout the 
impeachment proceedings against President Bill Clinton, both sides 
made arguments based on text, history, precedent, ethos, structure, and 
consequences.4 Those supporting President Clinton's ouster made the 
following arguments: First, the constitutional text supports a single 
standard of impeachable misconduct. Invariably, those seeking 
President Clinton's removal argued that there is only a single, 
constitutional clause spelling out the conditions for removal of those 
officials subject to it. In particular, they inferred a single standard for 
impeachment in the Constitution's particular provision subjecting ''the 
President, Vice-President, and officers of the United States" to possible 
removal for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors."5 Second, proponents of the President's ouster argued 
that history supported treating his misconduct as grounds for his 
removal. They pointed out, for instance, that the Framers' generation 
considered violating oaths to constitute a serious transgression,6 and the 
3. See generally PHIUP C. Boaam, 1HE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND TilE COURSE OF 
HISTORY (Knopf2002). PHILLIP C. Boaam, CONSTmJTIONAL FATE (1982). 
4. See generally 145 CONG. REC. S1,703, S1,703-18 (1999). 
5. U.S. CoNST. art. Ill, § 4. 
6. See Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 666,669 (1999). 
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Congress had previously removed federal judges for misconduct similar 
to the President's misconduct.7 Third, President Clinton's detractors 
argued that judicial precedent counted against him as well. In particular, 
they observed that the Supreme Court generally had left matters relating 
to the President's (and other impeachable officials') removal to the 
final, non-reviewable decision-making of the Congress. 8 Fourth, the 
American ethos called for President Clinton's removal. In particular, 
they argued that respect for the rule of law is indispensable for the 
integrity and unique character of the federal judicial process in the 
United States,9 and that the President had engaged in misconduct that 
disgraced the White House. 1° Fifth, inferences and arguments derived 
from the structure of the Constitution supported President Clinton's 
removal. They invariably claimed that the President's lying under oath 
constituted an attack against the federal judiciary.11 Sixth, pragmatic 
considerations weighed in favor of removing the President. They 
argued that acquitting the President would encourage similarly bad 
behavior from others12 and even threaten his relationship with the 
military, whose members could be court martialed for similar 
misconduct. 13 Those opposed to President Clinton's removal drew on 
7. TheBaclcgroundandHistoryof/mpeachmenJ: Judiclallmpeodunenl,1998 WL 781679(testimonyof 
John C. Harrison, Professor of Law, University of Virginia). 
8. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 249-50(1993) (White, J.,oonc:wring);seealsoMICHAELJ. 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 182 (2d cd., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000). 
9. See U.S. Senate ConJinues Impeachment Trial, 1999 WL 55235 ("[President Clinton's] perverse 
example inevitably undermines the integrity of both the office of the president and the judicial process."). 
10. See generally RICHARD A POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: 1)fE INvESnGATION,IMPEACHMENT, AND 
TluAL OF PREsiDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (Harvard Univ. Press 1999). 
11. See David Schippers Questions Kenneth Starr at Judiciary Committee Hearing, 1998 WL 804443 
("So when the President of the United States lies under oath ... and obstructs justice ... he is effectively 
attacking the judicial branch of the United States constitutional government''). 
12. Cf 145 Cong. Rec. S1,513, S1,523 (1999) ("[A]nyone who votes to acquit has to say that we are 
going to hold this President to a1ower standard of conduct and behavior than we hold other people.''). 
13. See id. 
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the same modalities of argumentation. First, they claimed that the 
constitutional text established an especially high threshold for 
impeaching presidents. In their judgment, the text requires that the 
misconduct for which a President may be removed has to be on the 
same order of magnitude or seriousness as "Treason" or "Bribery."14 
Second, historical materials supported acquitting the President. In 
particular, President Clinton's defenders argued that the Framers meant 
to restrict bases for removal to a President's abuse of the unique powers 
of his office, 15 and that the Congress had previously refused to sanction 
presidents for personal misbehavior (for example, the House Judiciary 
Committee refused to approve an article of impeachment against 
President Richard Nixon for income tax fraud). 16 Third, judicial 
precedent did not support, at least in the judgment of President Clinton's 
defenders, treating President Clinton's misconduct as impeachable. 
They argued that judicial precedents (and prosecutors) do not treat all 
lies under oath as the same. 17 Fourth, the American ethos did not dictate 
President Clinton's removal. In particular, they claimed, inter alia, lying 
about sex is a sensitive, personal matter better left to mechanisms other 
than impeachment, such as censure, the judgment of history, or even 
criminal prosecution subsequent to his departure from office. 18 Fifth, 
President Clinton's defenders argued that the structure of the 
14. See History of Impeachment, 1998 WL 786423 (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of 
Constitutional Law, Harvard University). 
IS. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, S I FLA. L REv. 599, 
606 (1999). 
16. See White House Presentation-Day 1, 1998 WL 846806 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman, former 
member of Congress from New York). 
17. See White House Presentation-Day 2, 1998 WL 854460 (testimony of William F. Weld, former 
Governor of Massachusetts); White House Presentation-Day 2, 1998 WL 854472 (testimony of Ronald K. 
Noble, Associate Professor of Law, New York University). 
18. See Sunstein, supra note I 5, at 611. 
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Constitution opposed transforming our government into a parliamentary 
system in which the legislature may remove a chief executive in whom 
it has lost confidence (or simply does not like). They claimed that the 
President's misconduct was a purely personal failing and not an official 
one!9 Last but not least, President Clinton's defenders found that 
pragmatic concerns weighed in favor of acquitting President Clinton. 
Removing President Clinton, they claimed, would weaken the 
presidency immeasurably; conceivably destroy the national, and perhaps 
international, economy; and invite attacks--perhaps even domestic 
attacks--against the United States.Z0 
These arguments support Professor Bobbitt's insight that no authority 
exists, or at least no obvious authority, on which there could be 
consensus for prioritizing the different modalities of constitutional 
argumentation. The federal political process seems to constitute a 
crucible for measuring the relative strengths and significance of the 
different modalities. Furthermore, these arguments reflect the obvious 
concern among political leaders regarding constitutional authorization, 
or limits, on their respective authorities. 
Similar concerns appear to operate in another important realm outside 
the Courts--namely, federal judicial selection, the second example 
which demonstrates the use of the conventional modalities of 
constitutional argumentation. The sharp divisions within the Senate 
over judicial selection have been in place for some time. Republicans 
blame the rejection of Robert Bork as a watershed event in judicial 
selection, while Democrats suggest it dates as far back as to the 
beginning of the Republic. However, each side justifies its position 
19. See History of Impeachment, 1998 WL 781680 (testimony of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.). 
20. See U.S. Representative Henry Hyde Holds Hearings on Impeachment of the President, 1998 WL 
857487. 
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regarding judicial nominations based on past practice and on structural 
inferences about the Senate's authority in the confirmation process. A 
recent argument supporting greater deference for judicial nominations 
states that the Senate should not inquire into federal district or circuit 
court nominees' ideologies because lower court judges have to follow 
Supreme Court precedent, and therefore they have no discretion to 
implement any disagreements they might have with Supreme Court 
precedent.21 Frankly, I fmd this contention hard to take seriously, for 
the simple reason that Republican senators do not appear to be prepared 
to sign off on all lower court nominations regardless of the nominating 
President's political party. The Clinton years demonstrate that, inter 
alia, Republican Senators are not prepared to make this concession 
because they (1) believe there are acceptable and unacceptable judicial 
ideologies and (2) care deeply about ensuring the appointments of 
judges with their preferred ideologies. 
A third example that illustrates national political leaders' recourse to 
the modalities of constitutional interpretation is foreign affairs. 
Professor Powell's excellent book illustrates his own extraordinary 
sensitivity to employing all the modalities of traditional constitutional 
argumentation. Even those whom he criticizes employ these modalities. 
Professor Powell points out, rightly I think, flaws in their use of these 
modalities. Indeed, the main factor demonstrating whether Professor 
Powell agrees or disagrees with the Office of Legal Counsel opinions is 
the manner in which22 authoritative figures prioritize the modalities. 
While it is tempting to think that political leaders will use the modality 
21. See Ideology and Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Commiltee, 1 08th Cong. 
(2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch); Thomas L. lipping, Winners and Losers Venus How You Play the 
Game: Should Ideology Drivf! Judicial Selection?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002). 
22. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces of Judicial Restraint, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REv. 3 ( 1993). 
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that best supports their contention, one can see that national political 
authorities, including lawyers, disagree vigorously over the 
prioritization and proper interpretation of the various modalities. Thus, 
it is easy to see that leaders care about the Constitution, but it is less 
clear how and in what ways it matters, including whether it constrains 
their decision-making. 23 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING OF POLITICAL 
LEADERS 
Another possible source of illumination on how the Constitution 
constrains or guides constitutional decision-making outside the Court is 
the activities of political leaders in foreign affairs. Does the 
Constitution ever constrain presidents or members of Congress from 
doing what they personally want to do in the realm of foreign affairs? It 
is fair to say that Professor Powell cites no instance in which the 
Constitution apparently has precluded, or barred, national political 
leaders from doing what they were bent on doing in the realm of foreign 
affairs. Is this because the Constitution exerts no constraint on them? 
Or is it because the Constitution impacts their decision-making in some 
other way(s)? 
Consider two examples. The first example is President Abraham 
Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus.24 As soon as 
President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus, Chief Justice Taney 
23. Professor PoweU suggests that this might not be the right question to ask. Instead, he suggests one 
should think differently about how the Constitution operates, particularly outside the Court. I do not think 
there is any disagreement between us. Here, I reiterate a point made previously that the critical question in 
constitutional law is not how the Constitution constrains official decision-making, but rather how the 
Constitution is implemented. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The End ofTheory, 96 Nw. U. L REv. 283 (2001). 
24. See Exec. Order of Apr. 21, 1861; Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation 
Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U.ILL. L REv. 1135, 1144 (2001). 
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·slapped him down;25 the Congress later, however, ratified President 
Lincoln's actions. 26 A possible lesson to be inferred from these actions 
is that the Congress and the Chief Justice helped to curtail, or impose a 
limit to, the illegality of President Lincoln's action. Another possible 
lesson might be that the political branches-President Lincoln and the 
Republican Congress-simply arrived where they wanted to go and 
needed to get. If the Constitution constrained activity at all, it appears to 
have constrained procedurally rather than substantively; it provided the 
path that national political leaders had to follow in order to achieve their 
preferred policy objectives. 
The second example, foreign affairs, drives this dynamic home. It 
appeared, for a long time, that war against Iraq had been inevitable. Bob 
Woodward's new book is just one source that confirms the popular 
suspicion that President George W. Bush had made up his mind to 
invade Iraq long before the actual invasion took place.27 Initially, the 
President had indicated a willingness to order the invasion without 
explicit congressional acquiescence, but then in apparent response to 
public pressure he sought and received an approving resolution passed 
by the Congress. The President appeared resistant to get the approval of 
the United Nations, but then begrudgingly allowed the United Nations 
to address his concerns, including ordering further weapons inspections 
in Iraq, before signaling his willingness to go ahead, with or without the 
United Nations' approval. This sequence of decision-making fits neatly 
into Professor Powell's conception of foreign affairs. This conception 
seems to be that the Constitution creates a process for interaction 
25. Ex parte Menirnan, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 (1863); see also DANIELA. FARBER, LlNCOLN'SCoNSTinmON 
(University of Chicago Press 2003). 
21. See generally BoB WOODWARD, PLAN OF A TrACK (2004). 
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between the President and the Congress over foreign affairs, but the 
Constitution sets forth no substantive limit on what either branch may 
do. So, we are left at the end of Professor Powell's book with a scenario 
in which the Constitution seems to matter largely, if not wholly, for 
creating a process for decision-making outside the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I want to express some skepticism of the notion that the 
Constitution provides no substantive check on presidential or 
congressional authority in the realm of foreign affairs. In assessing the 
Constitution outside the courts, we need to be careful to avoid 
employing the conceptions, or mind-set, we commonly employ in 
analyzing the Supreme Court. With the Court, there are winners and 
losers. There are also substantive outcomes. There is also often the 
cessation of a specific conflict, if not some resolution of a larger 
question of constitutional meaning. It is, however, a mistake to think 
that when the Court speaks it is the end of the story. In some cases, this 
might be true, but more often than not, the Court's decisions are part of 
a larger story or sequence of events. Bush v. Gore28 and Clinton v. 
Jonel-9 are just two examples of this common phenomenon. 
We need to recall that one branch rarely has final or unchecked 
authority on a subject. Indeed, the only realm in which this is 
technically accurate is impeachment, over which the Congress exercises 
sole formal authority. The common dynamic outside the courts is that 
the parties must reach accommodations or face painful conflicts. These 
accommodations occur on more than one level. Accommodations may 
28. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
29. 520 u.s. 681 (1997). 
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exist at the constitutional level, which involve, as we know, a special 
kind of politics-often referred to as "higher" politics as opposed to the 
ordinary politics involved in the everyday machinations of the Nation's 
capitol. These accommodations might sometimes be reflected in 
ordinary law or other forms, including, for example, international trade 
agreements such as NAFTA and treaties. In such circumstances, we 
find ourselves back to where Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch 
v. Marylancf0 warned we would be, that is, recognizing that the 
Constitution, in spite of what some might think, provides a "great 
outline" or framework that channels decision-making on various 
subjects. Stated slightly differently, the critical question in 
constitutional law, as reflected in foreign affairs (and other matters 
outside the Court), is how constitutional values are implemented, that is, 
how the Constitution is translated into action. If government respects 
those channels and implements values pursuant to its constitutionally 
granted authority (and procedures}, one cannot say that the Constitution 
has no force outside of the courts. To the contrary, its force is evident 
from its implementation. For this insight, among many other things, we 
have Professor Jefferson Powell to thank. 
30. 17 u.s. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 

